Archive for the ‘ identity ’ Category

Intro to crypto-less assertions

commented.org – Commented.org – Intro to crypto-less assertions :

Cryptography is normally difficult to get right, and given a choice most people would rather not deal with it. For most assertions, the asserter and the recipient need to agree on a trusted third party.

In real life, when Bob tells you something, you may not be ready to accept it just yet. Perhaps you need Dave and Eric to state the same fact before you accept it. Or perhaps if Alice said it, you’d be fine with it and wouldn’t need to hear from someone else.

That’s how we do it in real life: we trust people to various degrees. Crypto-less assertions strive to get rid of the issues with current crypto-based assertions. The crypto-less assertions map onto a real life in providing a means for relative trust.

I find this entire notion completely fascinating. I’ve seen and read about similar trust-building and relationship-utilising methods of trusting things—but one of my biggest concerns would be how to privately retain that information so that people can’t see who I trust.

This is probably an easy problem to solve, so easy in fact that I’ll feel like a complete fool once Hans explains it to me.

Why is something like this interesting to you?

Because it builds reputation and trust. One of the greatest things about weblogs and the web in general is that there are billions of people publishing things. Know what the biggest problem is? There are billions of people publishing things. You don’t know if someone is on the level, or re-blogging someone else, or plagiarizing. You don’t know if someone is who they say they are, and maybe you don’t care.

But if you’re a publisher, you should. Your brand is you, and being able to protect and assert your identity in a way that is easy to use and understand makes all the difference. This is a very creative way to solve parts of that problem and I think it will be an interesting topic as it gets discussed more.

Malicious Feeds

Read RSS, get hacked:

That’s because the growing use of Web feed readers and the proliferation of content-aggregation sites are giving hackers a really simple way to deliver keystroke loggers, Trojan horses and other malware onto their computers, security analysts warn.

The feed-hacking threat is not particularly new. However, the severity of the problem could be rising as feed services begin moving into the mainstream, said Ray Dickenson, vice president of product management at Authentium Inc., a Palm Beach, Fla.-based security vendor. “Malware authors are just taking advantage of the interconnectedness of Web 2.0” to distribute their code more efficiently, he said.

That is a rather interesting thing to think about. All of the various re-blogging sites out there and feed-mixers have the potential to impact the output of those feeds, certainly. And usually the big problem with this type of behavior is reputation—people re-distribute content and represent it as their own, or even make it difficult to find out exactly where something originated.

Unprotected reputation makes it easier for someone to maliciously abuse that reputation, if you read something written by So-and-So, and So-and-So’s name is trustworthy, you may well be more inclined to download an enclosure, play a media file, read a document, or anything else that is made available to you.

And while people are getting smarter about this behavior, the content itself isn’t protected, and thus lends itself to being easily copied, pasted, reblogged, or fed into hybrid amalgam feeds through the various mechanisms out there to do so. Yahoo! Pipes, for example, is a fabulous tool for massaging the output of feeds and allowing you to customize the way they are viewed and consumed, and there are plenty of web-based applications out there that do exactly this.

And since the user has to subscribe to a specific feed in nearly every circumstance, there is some level of trust already established, they did, in fact, subscribe to this feed, and they couldn’t have been making a mistake or been so naive. But never-the-less, it happens.

Enclosures in feeds aren’t a bad idea in and of themselves, it allows for things like Podcasting, and premium content to be distributed via RSS and Atom—and that is a wonderful thing. But the browsers and readers and clients that accept this data are typically told to pull the enclosures and add them to your iTunes library, or to open up Windows Media Player upon receipt, and that abuse of reputation and trust is bringing out a whole new landscape of potential attack vectors.

Not to mention the most obvious one, having malicious javascript present in a feed and having the reader dutifully follow its instructions. Most readers that I’ve looked at over the years strive for compatibility over correctness, so the very design of these readers is to be very forgiving on the contents of a feed, instead of validating the contents and sanitizing it.

I think it will be interesting to see what exactly happens with this mode of attack, and what the implications are of trusting unsigned and invalid data in content syndication formats. It will certainly be interesting to see if anyone actually follows this with some real diligence in helping people avoid this type of an attack.

Suddenly I’m curious if I can plant malicious javascript into my del.icio.us RSS feed.

Online bankers support tighter security

Online bankers support tighter security:

More than nine out of ten (91 per cent) bank account holders are willing to use new authentication methods that go beyond the standard ’username-and-password’, if their banks decided to offer stronger security, according to vendor RSA. In addition, trust in the online channel continues to erode. Some 82 per cent of account holders are less likely to respond to an email from their bank due to scams including phishing – up from 79 per cent in 2005 and 70 per cent in 2004 – and more than half say they are less likely to sign-up for or use online banking as a result. In addition, 44 per cent of account holders said they have become increasingly concerned about other types of attacks (besides phishing), such as Trojans and keyloggers, over the past six months.

I’ve been thinking a lot about this and all I can think of is why don’t they leverage the existing mobile devices that the vast majority of their customers have, to act as a form of secondary authentication?

Why not utilize mobile handsets as a computational device to generate secrets for the user, or even be a delivery mechanism for a secondary PIN when performing online transactions?